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the opt-out, and closer cooperation itself has given
rise to a suggestion (or fear) of 'Europe a la Carte' according to which states would pick and choose
which policies they would participate in-as yet this
EMILY REID
has not materialized.
See also: European constitution; European treaties
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The work of economist Ronald
Coase (1910-) transformed legal scholars' approaches to social policy, and spurred economists to focus
attention on how institutions function. When Coase
received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991, the
Nobel Committee cited two key articles concerning
Coase's pioneering notion of'transaction cost'.
In 'The Nature of the Firm', Coase pointed out
when an entrepreneur decides between purchasing
a factor of production through the market, or making the needed item himself, the decision will turn
on the comparative costs of transacting. That is, an
entrepreneur who goes the market route must bear
transaction costs such as searching for sources of
supply, comparing and verifying qualities of goods,
and negotiating contracts. If instead an entrepreneur goes the route of creating a firm to manufacture the factor in-house, she must bear costs such
as searching for potential employees and monitoring their performance. Understanding these
transaction costs can both help us understand the
size, shape and nature of firms, and make recommendations as to institutional structures that will
facilitate economic growth.
In 'The Problem of Social Cost', Coase examined
the problem ofintersecting activities that cause harm
to each other. Economist Arthur Pigou suggested
that the government should impose a tax or damages on the active party (for example, on the factory
emitting the pollution) to make that party's private
costs equal the social costs. The liable party would
then purportedly choose a socially optimal path as
it compared the social costs of its activity with the
profits it anticipated. Coase showed that in many
circumstances-depending on transaction coststhis rigid Pigovian rule would not achieve maximum
productivity: that harms are the consequence of two
activities interacting, and that the optimal route
might involve a combination of changed activities by
all parties.
Coase argued that in a world without transaction costs, it would not matter who bore the legal
liability: for example, if the factory bore the liability
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but its neighbours could better lower costs, the factory would pay the neighbours to take the needed
action. However, in the real world, where transaction costs are everywhere, the party bearing the liability might find it too costly to negotiate contracts
with its neighbours, and might instead respond to
the legal rule by curtailing production in a way that
was socially inefficient.
The latter discussion gave rise to the so-called
'Coase Theorem' (so named by co-Laureate, George
Stigler). It postulates that in the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain to an efficient solution
regardless of which parties receive rights through
law. Coase is sometimes misunderstood as suggesting that law is unimportant. To the contrary: the
point ofCoase's exploring how resources would flow
in a world without transaction costs was to underline
the crucial role that transaction costs play in understanding how law's effects play out.
Coase suggested that judges could legitimately
seek to foster the flow of resources to their most
productive uses. Notably, judges could deploy the
allocation of rights for purposes such as placing
resources initially in productive hands, and lowering transaction costs so that misplaced and undervalued resources can be easily transferred. Law can
do these things directly, and by affecting the shape
of institutions.
For lawyers, Coase's work functioned as if to
strip the social world to its elemental atoms. Scholars could track the way different legal rules affected
resource use and the shape of institutions, and seek
to affect the 'chemical reactions' directly. The resultant intoxication rewrote the history of law schools
for the next fifty years, under the rubric of 'Law and
Economics'. Others responsible for the growth of the
field include Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner.
WENDY/GORDON
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The Code Napoleon (as the
French Civil Code was known) is the most influential European legal document since Justinian's
Digest of 532 AD. Promulgated in 1804, it created the
unity of French private law. Previously, the private
law of France had consisted in a set of customs established and enforced by regional parlements, which
had limited similarities one to another. Some were
based on local customary law and some on Roman
law, together with canon law influences. The result
was that private law varied from one part of France
to another.
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